Leslie Butler, "Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal Reform" (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2007), and Neil Jumonville and Kevin Mattson, eds. "Liberalism for a New Century" (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007) by Furner, Mary O.
Leslie Butler, Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic
Liberal Reform (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2007), and Neil Jumonville and
Kevin Mattson, eds. Liberalism for a New Century (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2007).
These two books remind readers of the protean nature of United States liberal-
ism and raise the prospect that, after three decades of drift, it may be able to
renew itself. Liberalism for a New Century aims to instigate a renewal based on
reinstating core liberal values and policy commitments of an earlier time. The
book’s main thrust defends the democratic liberalism, concerned with economic
citizenship and social justice, that progressives and liberals built from the early
twentieth century through the 1940s. Editors Jumonville and Mattson and other
authors fault mid-twentieth century liberals for losing faith in their own ideals
(Alan Brinkley), abandoning formerly constructive relations with organised
labour and the left (Michael Kazin), buying too much into identity politics
(Jumonville and Mattson), forsaking the social gospel message that energized ear-
lier progressive movements for an amoral secularism (Amy Sullivan), and offer-
ing a feckless response to the rise of the Right (Jennifer Burns). For most of
these authors, liberalism’s potential for revival in the twenty-first century as a
broadly reformist ideology attuned to mainstream social and economic issues
depends on liberals pulling back from these failings and returning to core New
Deal-era liberal ideals.
Leslie Butler’s Critical Americans introduces an influential group of late
nineteenth century liberal intellectuals who were devoted to a different set of
ideals. The four key figures are Charles Eliot Norton, James Russell Lowell,
Thomas Wentworth Higginson, and George William Curtis, who—among
them—edited and wrote extensively for the Atlantic Monthly, Century, Harpers
Weekly, Harpers Monthly, Nation, Putnam’s, and (Higginson’s favorite venue)
Women’s Journal, working to establish critical journalism as a force for elevating
American intellectual and civic life. Initially men of letters, they were drawn as
well to more broadly political questions and to a role as public moralists. In
addition to marvelously detailed portraits of the central four, Butler provides ful-
some side glances at Nation editor E.L. Godkin and at the core group’s frequent
English correspondents, among them John Stuart Mill, Leslie Stephens, and
Frederic Harrison. No women figured in the group, where manliness—defined
by upright character rather than athletic vigor and bellicosity—was a requirement
for inclusion.
By placing these closely-linked careers in the context of trans-Atlantic
reform, Butler aims to overturn entrenched representations of Victorian political
intellectuals as mugwumpish “best men” and “genteel reformers,” put off by the
rough and tumble of US politics. The formative experience for Butler’s critical
Victorians was the US Civil War, to which they came as opponents of the
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Mexican-American War, passionate abolitionists (even, in Higginson’s case, active
John Brown supporters), and advocates for women’s suffrage. The Civil War in
their eyes presaged the blossoming of a true people’s democracy that could
inspire the democratization of all of Western civilization. Yet neither then nor
later, in the 1890s, was theirs a vision of radical, populist (or Populist) democra-
cy. It demanded sober reflection, moderation, and active cultivation by citizens
of their full intellectual and spiritual capacities. This explains the importance
these men assigned to informing public opinion on political matters. Their
vision of an educative democracy included schooling newly freed black voters on
equal terms. Supporters of Radical Reconstruction, they likened the Southern
planter class to much-despised British aristocrats who had supported secession
and continued to oppose suffrage expansion at home.
Butler adamantly rejects a depiction of these Gilded Age liberals as
soulless defenders of possessive individualism. Although their principled deser-
tion of the Republican Party in 1884 made them traitors in the eyes of party loy-
alists, it showed their determination to stand for liberal virtues of clean govern-
ment, honest money, and low tariff. The critical Victorians would eventually
lapse into despondency over US and British imperialism and bemoan the brutali-
ty practiced in the Philippine-American and Boer-British wars, but in their “mug-
w u m p ” political moment, Butler arg u e s, t h ey ach i eved ge nuine coherence in their beliefs.
Yet one might argue that this coherence strangely excluded concern for
some of the most serious social issues of the day. Butler grants these omissions
with this comment: “The liberals’ critique of Gilded Age politics included many
blind spots. Their inattention to many of the challenges presented by urban
poverty and the concentration of industrial power would cause ‘New Liberals’
and Progressives of a later generation to belittle the earlier reform vision as
overly timid and naïve” (177). But the fact that her subjects essentially had no
Social Question, that they ignored the most significant debates underway regard-
ing economic policy, should have elicited a harsher judgment. Butler neverthe-
less excels in identifying the core values that her Gilded Age liberals did passion-
ately defend.
The same can be said for the Jumonville-Mattson collection in its treat-
ment of New Deal and Great Society liberals. But what a shift in emphasis
occurred in core commitments between Butler’s subjects and those later social
liberals!  The critical Victorians linked Americans’ capacity for self-government
to qualities of intellect, taste, empathy, and devotion to duty that cultural uplift
could develop in individual citizens. For Jumonville and Mattson, mid-twentieth
century liberals linked democracy to strong government, active in its defense of
legal, political, economic, and social rights that would otherwise be denied. They
defended liberty of conscience, a regulated capitalist market in which govern-
ment ensured fairness, a generous welfare state, strong labour unions, and other
independent sources of countervailing power. The concern for social and eco-
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nomic equality missing among the critical Victorians provided the vital core of
New Deal liberalism. Yet—these writers contend—the rise of Soviet power and
the onset of the Cold War prompted liberals to cut off earlier close ties with
democratic socialists, the 1930s Popular Front left, and Henry Wallace support-
ers, with whom they had largely earlier agreed.
As the source of liberalism’s subsequent decline, Liberalism for a New
Century points an accusing finger toward a specific segment of the more recent
left. Although the New Left, the anti-war movement, and the rise of the Right
get some credit, special blame is reserved for an “academic and cultural left”
(ACL) that shifted its focus to cultural politics, beguiling credulous youth.
Influenced by postmodernism, the ACL preached the fluidity of meaning, cham-
pioned minorities, and cultivated a policy bias in favor of the “other” that
“derailed important liberal commitments and increased the American popula-
tions’ animosity toward liberalism”(7). Even Jennifer Burns’ nuanced chapter on
liberalism and the conservative imagination, though granting more agency to the
Rise of the Right, still credits the liberals’ shift from class to culture, and from
emphasizing economic issues and the role of the state to stressing moral issues,
for liberals’ inability to respond effectively to the appeal of neoconservatism.
Not surprisingly in a multi-authored work, the volume’s contributors
disagree on elements of this overarching narrative. Berkowitz and John Diggins
demur regarding US liberalism’s ideological pedigree. Berkowitz argues for a
central paradox in the long history of liberalism: a passion for liberty and order
moved nineteenth century liberals, whereas mid-twentieth century “progressive
liberals” prized equality above liberty and turned statist to achieve it, undermin-
ing the necessary balance between democracy and individual rights. Diggins
attacks left-leaning professors for ignoring the teachings of early American polit-
ical thinkers, who wisely designed a state able to restrain the passions that would
motivate humans much of the time. From Mattson, Jumonville, and other key
contributors, the academic and cultural left gets most of the credit for weakening
liberalism’s hold on the national imagination. “The ACL embraced the worst
excesses of ‘political correctness,’ affirmative action, and identity politics,” (7) the
editors charge, and their attacks on traditional beliefs and values alienated god-
fearing, country-loving Middle Americans. We do get a careful critique, drawn
by Mona Harrington, of the serious flaws in what passed in liberalism’s heyday,
and continues to pass, for a family policy. Yet the volume’s framing seems exces-
sively to discount as proper concerns of liberals the subordination of women,
the gay bashing, the institutionalized racism, and the Euro-American chauvinism
that were routine aspects of life at mid-century. Indeed, the arguments present-
ed here against the ACL are more than a little reminiscent of attacks on the pro-
fessoriate, and on liberal and progressive intellectuals more generally that have
typically come not from Middle Americans, but rather from disgruntled figures
on the academic (e.g., David Horowitz) and cultural right.
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In the final section of Liberalism for a New Century, Danny Postel and
Michael Tomasky extend the postmortem for liberalism to foreign policy in ways
that support the general tenor of the earlier chapters: the liberalism of the New
Deal and the Great Society was better, more authentic, more universally appeal-
ing than the anti-establishment, anti-capitalist, postmodern, anything-goes post-
1960s liberalism of relativism, fluid identity, and lifestyle choice. Postel argues
that Iranian intellectuals’ fondness for Habermas, Popper, and Arendt reveals
how appealing an older, Enlightenment-based liberalism of individual freedom,
political democracy, and rights remains in much of the non-Western world.
Tomasky contends that liberal hawks who supported the Iraq war and liberal
doves who opposed it need to own up to their mistakes: for hawks, their defense
of the invasion as a justifiable effort to establish democracy, when George Bush
actually intended to establish a client state in the Middle East; and for doves, the
view that any foreign intervention whatsoever is always illegitimate. Both groups
should resubscribe to a pre-Bush liberal internationalism, argues Tomasky, in
which fighting wars to right unacceptable wrongs may at times be both legitimate
and necessary.
The strongest (and most controversial) message of the edited volume
is a call for return to liberalism at its best and brightest, when liberals achieved
significant steps toward a welfare state, established (de jure) full civil rights, set in
place international structures and policies that ultimately defeated communism,
and retained a diverse middle and working class base in the Democratic Party.
Thus the volume can be read as an endorsement of the vision that placed Barack
Obama in the White House, promising to withdraw US forces from Iraq, redress
wrongs perpetrated at Guantanamo, achieve universal health care, restore essen-
tial economic regulation, and deal with global warming. Yet the serious defense
of workers’ job and organiing rights that these writers see as essential to liberal-
ism has not had top billing in the Obama agenda; nor, it currently appears, will a
significant redistribution of income and wealth be a major goal of the rebuilding
of economic regulation. Perhaps more renewal will be needed.
Mary O. Furner 
University of California, Santa Barbara
Louis Adamic, Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America
(Edinburgh, Oakland, West Virginia: AK Press, 2008).
In 1931, as the Great Depression gathered steam, Louis Adamic published
Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America. Adamic, a self-taught Slovenian
immigrant who came to the United States in 1913, drew on extensive experience
as a wage labourer and his wide reading of literature on the labour movement to
create a compelling “popular” account of violence in American labour history.
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